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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONS.-
In a bill against the Real Estate Commissioners the attorney-general of
Florida requested them to show the source of their authority. State v. Rose
(Fla. 1929) 122 So. 225. He contended that the statute which created the
commission, giving it power to license real estate brokers and agents on re-
ceiving evidence of their honesty and good repute was unconstitutional in
practically all of its many provisions, particularly because it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by restraining citizens from entering a useful oc-
cupation, and therefore that it was an unjustifiable exercise of the police
power. The act also contained provisions for the exclusion of nonresidents
from the occupation. The court was divided on the constitutionality of this
section, some of the judges being of the opinion that it did not comply with
the requirement that the citizens of one state shall be given equal protection
under the laws of every other state. The rest of the act (Fla. Laws 1927,
ch. 12223) was found not unconstitutional. Although one provision of an
act is void, it does not follow that the whole is bad. Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., (1894) 158 U. S. 601.
This occupation is one of the last to be brought under general police power
regulation, but similar statutes have been upheld, sometimes reluctantly, in
the following cases. Hoblitzel v. Jenkins (1924) 204 Ky. 122, 263 S. W.
764; Bratton v. Chandler (1922) 260 U. S. 110; Hall v. Geizer-Jones Co.
(1917) 242 U. S. 539; Riley v. Chambers (1919) 181 Cal. 589, 185 Pac. 855;
Payne v. Volkman (1924) 183 Wis. 412, 198 N. W. 438.
In passing on the Ohio "Blue Sky" law regulating and licensing stock
brokers, the court said that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prevent the states from regulating or eliminating a
conspicuous evil. Hall v. Geizer-Jones Co., above. The court said in Hoblitzel
v. Jenkins, which concerns real estate brokers, that the legislature could not
arbitrarily regulate a business or occupation unless it appeared to the court
that its unrestricted pursuit imperiled in some degree the health, safety,
morals or public welfare. However, the statute, providing for a commis-
sion similar to the one in the principal case, was held constitutional over the
objection that it violated the due process provision and that it took private
property without compensation.
Justice Strum in the principal case explained that the justification for
such legislation lies in the fact that the pursuit of the occupation creates a
fiduciary relation between the broker and the citizen, involving trust and
confidence. It is generally known that this trust is often betrayed to the in-
jury of the public. Payne v. Volkman, above, cited instances where un-
scrupulous brokers had made fortunes defrauding the purchasers of real es-
tate. Land swindles are common occurrences during a boom or in a sparse-
ly-settled country.
Admitting a prevailing evil, the constitutionality of such regulation is still
for the court to decide. "A lawful and useful occupation may be subject to
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regulations in the public interest, the test being whether or not the regula-
tion goes further than throwing a reasonable safeguard around the exercise
of the right." Riley v. Chambers, above.
The decision in the principal case is in harmony with the general attitude
of the courts toward the regulation of this occupation which is well ex-
pressed by the Payne v. Volkman case, in which the court said, "Although
such a statute is drastic we cannot say that it is unconstitutional."
H. V. C., '31.
CONsTITuTIOAL LAw-POwER OF CITY TO LICENSE SOFT DRINK PAR-
LORS.-The proprietor of a grocery in Milwaukee was recently prosecuted
under an ordinance of the city for selling flavored soda water, containing
no alcoholic content, without obtaining the license required by the enact-
ment. On appeal by the city from an acquittal in the court of first
instance the issue was taken to the State Supreme Court, which declared
the ordinance in question unconstitutional. City of Milwaukee v. Meyer
(Wis. 1929) 224 N. W. 106.
By express provision in its charter the city had the power to regulate
saloons, groceries and other places where spirituous, vinous or fermented
liquors were sold or given away. Likewise, by state enactment, a license
was required of all sellers of non-intoxicating but alcohol-containing liquors
and beverages. The ordinance here involved was as follows: "No person,
unless licensed [under state enactment] to sell non-intoxicating liquors,
shall sell nonalcoholic beverages without a license to be granted by the
common council in its discretion." Nonalcoholic drinks were defined as all
flavored drinks commonly referred to as soft drinks, containing no alco-
holic content. A license fee of five dollars per annum was fixed.
In declaring such an enactment unconstitutional the court seems to base
its decision in the main upon the theory that an express grant of legislative
power is a condition precedent to the validity of a municipal ordinance, and
any attempted exercise of power must be brought within a reasonable con-
struction of such a grant. That in itself is no doubt a valid position, but
the application of that rule to void the ordinance here involved seems ques-
tionable at best. By statute the common council of the city was granted
the power "to act for the government and good order of the city, for its
commercial benefit, and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public,
and may carry out its powers by license, regulation, suppression, borrow-
ing of money, tax levy, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, and other neces-
sary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred shall be in ad-
dition to all other grants, and shall be limited only by express language."
Wis. Stat. (1927) sec. 62.11 (5). In view of this most general and liberal
grant of power the holding of the court that the ordinance in question can-
not be upheld as within the power of the common council seems erroneous.
It would seem that the exercise of power by the council herein should be
sustained as -rithin a reasonable construction of the grant.
A much earlier case in the same jurisdiction was authority for the ruling
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss2/11
